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Abstract. The ARMADILLO cryptographic primitive is a multi-purpose crypto-
graphic primitive for RFID devices proposed at CHES’10. The main purpose of
the primitive is to provide a secure authentication in a challenge-response pro-
tocol. It has two versions, named ARMADILLO (subsequently denoted by AR-
MADILLO1) and ARMADILLO2. However, we found a fatal weakness in the de-
sign which allows a passive attacker to recover the secret key in polynomial time,
of ARMADILLO1 and some generalizations. We introduce some intermediate de-
signs which try to prevent the attack and link ARMADILLO1 to ARMADILLO2.
Considering the fact that the attack against ARMADILLO1 is polynomial, this
brings about some concerns into the security of the second version ARMADILLO2,
although it remains unbroken so far.
1 Introduction
ARMADILLO is a hardware oriented multi-purpose cryptographic primitive presented at
CHES’10 [2]. It was built for RFID applications. It can be used as a PRF/MAC, e.g. for
a challenge-response protocol as a MAC, and also as a hash function for digital signa-
tures, or a PRNG for making a stream cipher. It has two versions, named ARMADILLO
(subsequently denoted by ARMADILLO1) and ARMADILLO2.
During the review process of CHES’10 we found an attack against ARMADILLO1
and its variants. The ARMADILLO2 includes a quick fix to resist it. The attack and its
variants are presented in this paper.
To fix the vulnerability of ARMADILLO1 and simultaneously shrink the design, we
define multiple intermediate versions of ARMADILLO and we investigate their security
with respect to the original attack and illustrate that they are still vulnerable to a key re-
covery or a forgery attack. Although our attack is not applicable against ARMADILLO2,
the step by step approach in the design of other variants would give a concern behind the
security of ARMADILLO2. These intermediate designs reveal that the security bounds
on ARMADILLO2 might be insufficient.
We introduce a generalized version ARMADILLOgen and we explain when the key
recovery or forgery attack is possible. Finally, we come to the definition of ARMADILLO2.
The attacks we show have always complexity polynomial in the size of input. Specif-
ically, the attack against ARMADILLO1 has complexity O(k2 logk) and it can be per-
formed “by hand“, as the actual key recovery algorithm is very simple.
1.1 Related work
In [1] the authors found an attack against ARMADILLO2 based on parallel matching.
The key recovery attack against FIL-MAC application of ARMADILLO2-A and AR-
MADILLO2-E using single challenge-response pair is 27 and 218 times faster than ex-
haustive search respectively. The techniques presented in our paper may help to reduce
the time complexity if the attacker uses multiple samples.
2 Description of ARMADILLO
ARMADILLO relies on data-dependent bit transpositions. Given a bitstring x with bit
ordering x = (x`‖· · ·‖x1), fixed permutations σ0 and σ1 over the set {1,2, . . . , `}, a bit
string s, a bit b∈ {0,1} and a permutation σ, define xσs = x when s has length zero, and
xσs‖b = xσs◦σb , where xσ is the bit string x transposed by σ, that is,
xσ = (xσ−1(`)‖· · ·‖xσ−1(1))
The function (s,x) 7→ xσs is a data-dependent transposition of x. The function s 7→σs
can be seen as a particular case of the general semi-group homomorphism from {0,1}∗
to a group G.
Notations. Throughout this document, ‖ denotes the concatenation of bitstrings,
⊕ denotes the bitwise XOR operation, x denotes the bitwise complement of a bitstring
x; we assume the little-endian numbering of bits, such as x = (x`‖· · ·‖x1).
In this section, we give the description of two variants ARMADILLO1 and AR-
MADILLO2. Then, we introduce a common generalized version ARMADILLOgen and
show how it relates to all versions. We show the attack against ARMADILLOgen for
many different choices of parameters.
2.1 ARMADILLO1
ARMADILLO1 maps an initial value C and a message block U to two values (see Fig. 1)
.
(VC,VT ) = ARMADILLO1(C,U)
ARMADILLO1 works based on a register Xinter. By definition, C and VC are of c
bits, VT as well as each block Ui are of m bits, Xinter is of k = c+m bits. ARMADILLO1
is defined by integer parameters c, m, and two fixed permutations σ0 and σ1 over the
set {1,2, . . . ,2k}. Concretely, we consider m ≥ 40 and k = c + m. To initialize AR-
MADILLO1, Xinter is set to C‖0m where 0m is a null padding block, and C is an initial
value. ARMADILLO1 works as follows (Fig. 1).
1: in the i-th step, replace the rightmost m-bit block of Xinter by the block Ui;
2: set a ` = 2k bits register x = Xinter‖Xinter;
2
3: x undergoes a sequence of bit permutations which we denote by P. The output of
this sequence of bit permutations is truncated to the rightmost k bits, denoted S, by
S = tailk((Xinter‖Xinter)σXinter)
4: set Xinter to the value of S⊕Xinter.
5: after processing the last block Un, take (VC‖VT ) = Xinter as the output.
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Fig. 1. Scheme of ARMADILLO1.
2.2 ARMADILLO2
For completeness, we now provide the description of ARMADILLO2 [2] here. The AR-
MADILLO2 is mostly based on ARMADILLO1b (be defined later) with an additional pre-
processing mechanism. As the reader see later in the paper, the pre-processing prevents
our attack. We note that the pre-processing step outputs a sequence of bits that defines
the data dependent permutation and ensures that the data dependent permutation σXinter
cannot be easily controlled by the attacker (see Fig. 2).
1: in the i-th step, replace the rightmost m-bit block of Xinter by the block Ui;
2: set a ` = k bits register x = Xinter;
3: x undergoes a sequence of bit permutations, σ0 and σ1 and a constant γ addition,
which we denote by P. In fact, P maps a bitstring of m bits and a vector x of k
bits into another vector of k bits as P(s‖b,x) = P(s,xσb ⊕ γ), where b ∈ {0,1} and
xσb is a permutation of bits of x (transposition). The output of this sequence of k
bit permutations and constant addition is denoted Y = P(Ui,x). We call this step
pre-processing, since it is used to define the permutation for the consequent step.
3
4: x undergoes a sequence of bit permutations and constant addition P defined by Y .
The output of this sequence of k bit permutations and constant addition is denoted
S = P(Y,x).
5: set Xinter to the value of S⊕Xinter.
6: after processing the last block Un, take (VC‖VT ) as the output.
Y = P(Ui,C‖Ui)
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Fig. 2. Scheme of ARMADILLO2.
3 General ARMADILLOgen Algorithm
We define various intermediate versions of ARMADILLO. These intermediate versions
show the relation between ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO2 and give a security con-
cern on ARMADILLO2. We explain step by step how the weakness in the design of
ARMADILLO1 relate to a possible weaknesses in design of ARMADILLO2.
All these versions are based on data-dependent permutation P. They all can be cov-
ered under ARMADILLOgen as a parametrized version of distinct variants, and by setting
corresponding parameters we obtain ARMADILLO1, ARMADILLO1b, ARMADILLO1c,
ARMADILLO1d and ARMADILLO2. We show an attack against ARMADILLOgen for
some choices of parameters.
ARMADILLOgen is defined as
ARMADILLOgen(X) = T4(P(T1(X),T2(X)),X)
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where
P(s‖b,Y ) = P(s,T3(b,Y ))
P(λ,Y ) = Y
λ denotes the empty string, T1, T2, and T4 are some linear functions, and T3 in its most
general form is
T3(b,Y ) = L(Y )σb ⊕ γ
where L is linear and γ is a constant.
Then, ARMADILLO1 is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = X
T2(X) = X‖X
T3(b,X) = Xσb
T4(X ,Y ) = tailk(X)⊕Y
ARMADILLO2 is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = P(tailm(X),X)
T2(X) = X
T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ
T4(X ,Y ) = X ⊕Y
3.1 ARMADILLO1b: Shrinking the Xinter Register
The ARMADILLO1b is a compact version of ARMADILLO1 which prevents the preserva-
tion of Hamming weight by adding a constant. However, it does not prevent the attack
against ARMADILLO1. According to [2], the ARMADILLO1 design prevents a distin-
guishing attack based on constant Hamming weight by having the double sized internal
register and the final truncation, assuming the output of P transposition looks pseudo-
random. We see later in this paper (see section 4) that this proof does not hold in stan-
dard attack model and ARMADILLO1 can be broken in polynomial time. First, we define
ARMADILLO1b and then demonstrate an attack against this version and explain how the
same attack can be used against ARMADILLO1.
ARMADILLO1b is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = X
T2(X) = X
T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ
T4(X ,Y ) = X ⊕Y
In the design of ARMADILLO1b the state size is reduced to k bits to save more gates.
So, there is only the register Xinter and not its complement, and there is no truncation.
To avoid Hamming weight preservation, after each permutation there is an XOR of the
current state with a constant γ (see Fig. 3).
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Fig. 3. Scheme of ARMADILLO1b.
3.2 ARMADILLO1c: Adding a Linear Layer in T3
To investigate whether a more complex layer in T3 can prevent the attack on AR-
MADILLO1b we define ARMADILLO1c. It is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = X
T3(b,X) = L(X)σb ⊕ γ
for a linear transformation L, with arbitrary linear T2 and T4.
3.3 ARMADILLO1d: Adding a Fixed Transposition in T1
We will see later that ARMADILLO1c is still vulnerable. To prevent the attack on AR-
MADILLO1c, a fixed transposition was added in T1 to mix the bits of the secret and the
challenge. ARMADILLO1d is defined as ARMADILLOgen for
T1(X) = Xpi
T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ
for a fixed permutation pi and with arbitrary linear T2 and T4.
4 Key Recovery Attack against ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b
In this section, we describe an attack against two versions of ARMADILLO. We first
explain the attack on ARMADILLO1b and then setting γ = 0 and extending the initial
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state to (Xinter‖Xinter) = (C‖U‖C‖U), the same attack can be directly used against
ARMADILLO1.
Since ARMADILLO has more than one applications, we just briefly explain how it
is deployed in the challenge-response application. We refer the reader to [2] for more
details. The objective is to have a fixed input-length MAC. Suppose that C is a secret
and U is a one block challenge. The value VT is the response or the authentication tag.
We write
VT = ARMADILLO(C,U)
As can be seen from the description of the algorithm, there is no substitution layer.
This means that for a fixed key C the permutation σC is fixed (but unknown). As we
see later in the paper, it can be easily recovered. For the attack it suffices to recover
the mapping σC of a single index, for instance we recover σC( j) = n for some value
j. If we can recover the mapping σC( j), we than take challenges Ui so that j-th bit of
P(Ui,C‖Ui) contains different bits of the key. This allows us to recover the secret key
from literally reading the key from the output of ARMADILLO1b. We also show that the
attack can be extended to other scenarios, or can be changed to forgery attack if the key
recovery is not possible. More precisely, we consider
T1(X) = X
T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ
with arbitrary linear T2 and T4. This includes ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b.
The attack is based on the fact that a bit permutation is linear with respect to XOR
operation, i.e., for a permutation σ, X and Y be two vectors, we have (X ⊕Y )σ = Xσ⊕
Yσ.
Lemma 1. For any T3, C, and U, we have
P(C‖U ,C‖U) = P(C,P(U ,C‖U))
Proof. We easily prove it by induction on the size of C. uunionsq
Lemma 2. For T3(b,X) = Xσb ⊕ γ, there exists a function f : 2|X | → 2|X | such that for
any Y = (yk‖ . . .‖y1) and X, we have
P(Y,X) = XσY ⊕ f (Y )
Proof. Let rewrite
P(Y,X) =
(((
Xσy1 ⊕ γ
)
σy2
⊕ γ
)
σy3
⊕ γ . . .
)
σyk
⊕ γ
Let define the prefix of Y as
prefix(Y ) = {Yj; Yj = (yk‖ . . .‖y j),1 ≤ j ≤ k}
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Thus, P can be rewritten as
P(Y,X) = (X ⊕ γ)σY ⊕ γ⊕
M
p∈prefix(Y )
γσp = XσY ⊕P(Y,0)
uunionsq
Now we apply the above results to ARMADILLOgen with T1(X) = X and T3(b,X) =
Xσb ⊕ γ.
ARMADILLOgen(C‖U) = T4(P(C‖U ,T2(C‖U)),C‖U)
= T4(P(C,P(U ,T2(C‖U))),C‖U)
= T4(P(C,(LU (C)σU ⊕ f (U))),C‖U)
= T4
(
(LU(C)σU ⊕ f (U))σC ⊕ f (C),C‖U
)
where LU(C) = T2(C‖U) and f (U) is given by Lemma 2. The first equality is coming
from the definition, the second from Lemma 1 and the last two from Lemma 2. So, we
can write
ARMADILLOgen(C‖U) = L
(
(LU(C)σU ⊕ f (U))σC ⊕g(U)⊕h(C)
)
for some linear function L and some functions g and h. For all the variants we consider, L
is either the identity function or consists of dropping a few bits. For ARMADILLO1b and
ARMADILLO1 the function h(C)= f (C)⊕(C‖0m), g(U)= (0c‖U). Similarly, L(X)= X
and L(X) = tailk(X) respectively.
In what follows, we consider an arbitrary i and take a vector ei such that ei ·L(X) =
X [i], i.e, the i-th bit of register X . So, we obtain
ei ·ARMADILLOgen(C‖U) = (LU(C)σU ⊕ f (U))σ−1C (i)⊕g(U)i⊕h(C)i
Clearly, there exists a j = σ−1C (i) such that
ei ·ARMADILLOgen(C‖U)⊕g(U)i = LU (C)σ−1Ut ( j)
⊕ f (U) j ⊕h(C)i (1)
In chosen-input attacks against the PRF mode, we assume that the adversary can com-
pute
ei ·ARMADILLOgen(C‖U)
for a chosen U and a secret C. In the challenge-response application, we only have
access to VT , but in all considered variants, ei has Hamming weight one, so we just
need to select i so that this bit lies in the VT window. We introduce an attack (see Fig. 4)
which only needs this bit of the response for n = k logk queries. This algorithm has
complexity O (k2 logk) to recover the secret C (also see Fig. 5). In fact, the attacker can
simply recover the permutation Y = P(Ui,Xinter), since she has control over Ui’s. Now,
her goal is to find out how P(C,Y ) maps the index j to i. The goal of the algorithm is
to find this mapping and recovers C. It is exploiting the fact that fixing the i, then h(C)i
is fixed for all challenges and the left side of Eq. (1) can be computed directly by the
adversary. Then, it recovers C by solving an overdefined linear system of equations and
check it has a solution. If so, it checks whether the recovered C is consistent with other
samples.
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1: Pick a random i from 1 to m.
2: for t from 1 to n = k logk do
3: collect challenge-response pair (Ut ,ei ·ARMADILLOgen(C‖Ut))
4: compute bt = ei ·ARMADILLOgen(C‖Ut )⊕g(Ut )i.
5: end for
6: for j from 1 to ` do
7: for each β ∈ {0,1} do
8: set h(C)i = β.
9: for t from 1 to n do
10: compute LUt (C)σ−1Ut ( j) = bt ⊕ f (Ut) j ⊕β for all c bits.
11: end for
12: solve the system of n linear equations LUt (C)σ−1Ut ( j)
13: if no solution then
14: break
15: end if
16: derive C
17: if C is consistent with samples then
18: output C.
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
Fig. 4. The key recovery algorithm against ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b.
Attack complexity. The first for loop runs ARMADILLO algorithm k logk times . The sec-
ond loop runs ` times where ` = 2k for ARMADILLO1 and ` = k for ARMADILLO1b. We
perform up to 2k logk simple arithmetic operations in the second loop to compute val-
ues LUt (C)σ−1Ut ( j)
. Solving the system of n linear equation requires O(n3) in general case.
However, in the case of ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b every line contains only one
variable of secret C, which comes from the Lemma 2. As we have k logk equations
in c variables, if the mapping i → j is not guessed correctly we have high probability
to obtain contradiction on line 13. So overall, we have complexity of O(k2 logk) for
attacking both ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b.
Probability of success. We first choose randomly k logk challenges Ut and compute
ARMADILLOgen(C‖Ut). That is because, according to coupon collector problem [3]
the expected number of challenges so that every bit of C is mapped to i-th bit of output
is k logk. Therefore, among k logk challenges all the bits of challenge and all the bits of
secret key are mapped to a single bit of the output. The attacker can derive equation for
the j-th bit of P(Ut ,C‖Ut), and for k logk distinct challenges Ut the set of equations will
have full rank. These equations do not change through the fixed mapping σC, only the
constant term might change due to term P(C,0). Therefore if the attacker guess j → i
correctly, the set of k logk equations in c variables has a solution, otherwise the set of
k logk equations in c variables has no solution with probability at least 1−2−n.
Failure of the previous attack. The previously mentioned attack would fail, if the per-
mutations σ0, σ1 map bit indices in the set [1,m] to the set [1,m], i.e., σ0[1..m] = [1..m]
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Fig. 5. Scheme of the key recovery algorithm against ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO1b.
and σ1[1..m] = [1..m]. So, it might be speculated that picking such permutations in the
design makes the cryptosystem secure. However, the ARMADILLO with such permuta-
tions is vulnerable to a simple forgery attack.
Let remind the decomposition
ARMADILLO1b(C‖U) = P(C‖U,C‖U)⊕ (C‖U)
= P(C,P(U,C‖U))⊕ (C‖U)
= P(C,(L(C)σU ⊕ f (U)))⊕g(U)
= (L(C)σU ⊕ f (U))σC ⊕g(U)⊕h(C)
Given m challenges which form a linearly independent system, we can compute the
response by solving the set of these linear equations.
5 Attack Extension with Linear Layer in T3 (ARMADILLO1c)
T3 function is very simple in the previous versions. The first attempt to prevent the
previous attack is to use a more complex layer but still linear and check whether it
prevents the attack. We define another intermediate version and call it ARMADILLO1c.
Then, we show that only adding a linear layer L in T3(b,X) = L(X)σb ⊕ γ would not
prevent the attack.
Let L be a linear transformation. This attack requires O(k) challenges and three Gaus-
sian eliminations which require O(k3) operations. We define the new ARMADILLO1c as
follows.
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ARMADILLO1c(C‖U) = T4(P(C‖U,T2(C‖U)),(C‖U))
where
P(s‖b,Y ) = P(s,L(Y )σb ⊕ γ)
P(λ,Y ) = Y
We build a system of equations, where
ARMADILLO1c(C‖U j) = T4 (P(C‖U j,T2(C‖U j)),C‖U j)
= T4 (P(C,P(U j,T2(C‖U j))),C‖U j)
= T4 (P(C,P(U j,T2(C‖0)⊕T2(0‖U j))),C‖U j)
= T4 (P(C,P(U j,T2(C‖0))⊕P(U j,T2(0‖U j))),C‖U j)
= T4
(
LC(LU j (C)⊕ γ j)⊕P(C,0),C‖U j
)
where LU j (C) = P(U j,T2(C‖0)) and γ j = P(U j,T2(0‖U j)).
We use the fact that a set of ck + 1 equations LU j (C) is linearly dependent. Using
this we can bypass the unknown mapping LC. We can find a set J of equations whose
sum is 0. Let ε be the parity of the cardinality of J. We obtain
M
j∈J
ARMADILLO1c(C‖U j) = T4
(
LC
(
M
j∈J
γ j
)
⊕ εP(C,0),εC‖
M
j∈J
U j
)
Using the above expression with several J’s, we can recover linear mapping LC and
P(C,0). Using the knowledge of LC(X) we recover P(C,2i) for 0 < i < k. We do this by
Gaussian elimination on values
(
M
j∈J
γ j
)
. Using P(C,2i) for 0≤ i < k, we can recover
LU j (C) as follow.
ARMADILLO1c(C‖U j) = T4
(
LC(LU j (C)⊕ γ j)⊕P(C,0),C‖U j
)
= T4
(
LC(LU j (C)),C‖0
)
⊕T4 (LC(γ j)⊕P(C,0),0‖U j)
Therefore, we can compute
T4
(
LC(LU j (C)),C‖0
)
= ARMADILLO1c(C‖U j)⊕T4 (LC(γ j)⊕P(C,0),0‖U j)
Let consider Ui 6= U j, we have
∆(Ui,U j) =T4 (LC(LUi(C)),C‖0)⊕T4
(
LC(LU j (C)),C‖0
)
=T4
(
LC(LUi (C)⊕LU j(C)),0
)
=ARMADILLO1c(C‖Ui)⊕T4 (LC(γi)⊕P(C,0),0‖Ui)
⊕ARMADILLO1c(C‖U j)⊕T4 (LC(γ j)⊕P(C,0),0‖U j)
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Hence, we obtain
LUi(C)⊕LU j (C) = L
−1
C (T
−1
4 (ARMADILLO1c(C‖Ui)⊕T4 (LC(γi)⊕P(C,0),0‖Ui)
⊕ARMADILLO1c(C‖U j)⊕T4 (LC(γ j)⊕P(C,0),0‖U j) ,0))
Since LUi(C) is a known transformation linear in C we can recover the secret key by
solving the set of linear equations.
6 Attack Extension with a Fixed Transposition in T1
(ARMADILLO1d)
6.1 Case with no general T2 and T4
The previous attack can be prevented by using an S-box layer. However, if the underly-
ing permutation P is not predictable then we can not apply the aforementioned attack.
We used P(U,C‖U) to generate linear equations, and then guess the mapping P(C,Y ).
So, an attempt is to mix bits of C and U . But then, we show that even though we do not
know the secret parts of permutation since these parts are fixed, we can guess them one
by one. We design a version called ARMADILLO1d that first applies a fixed permutation
pi on the first register, i.e., T1 is a transposition. Then, we show that setting T1 to be a
transposition does not prevent a forgery attack. ARMADILLO1d is defined as follows.
ARMADILLO1d(C‖U) = T4(P((C‖U)pi,T2(C‖U)),(C‖U))
where
P(s‖b,Y ) = P(s,Yσb ⊕ γ)
P(λ,Y ) = Y
We first consider a simple case for T1 when bits of challenge U form an interval (see
Fig. 6), and T2 is identity and T4(X ,Y ) = X⊕Y . Later, we extend the attack to a general
transposition T1, T2 and T4.
ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U) = P(C1‖U‖C2,C1‖C2‖U)⊕ (C1‖C2‖U)
Let denote X = (C1‖C2‖U). We have
ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U) = P(C1‖U‖C2,X)⊕X
= P(C1‖U,P(C2,X))⊕X
= P(C1,P(U,P(C2,X)))⊕X
Concentrating on an arbitrary output bit n and using Lemma 2, we obtain
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Fig. 6. The compression function of ARMADILLO1d
ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U)[n] = P(C1,P(U,P(C2,C1‖C2‖U)))[n]
⊕(C1‖C2‖U)[n]
t=σ−1C1
(n)
= P(C1,0)[n]⊕P(U,P(C2,C1‖C2‖U))[t]
⊕(C1‖C2‖U)[n]
l=σ−1U (t)= P(C1,0)[n]⊕P(U,0)[t]⊕P(C2,C1‖C2‖U)[l]
⊕(C1‖C2‖U)[n]
i=σ−1C2 (l)= P(C1,0)[n]⊕P(U,0)[t]⊕P(C2,0)[l]
⊕(C1‖C2‖U)[i]⊕ (C1‖C2‖U)[n]
Re-arranging the above expression, for al = P(C2,0)[l] and bn = P(C1,0)[n] we obtain
ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U)[n]⊕g(U)[t]⊕X [n]⊕X [i]= (al ⊕bn) (2)
We follow Fig. 7. for the attack scenario. Let n = σC1(t) and l = σC2(i), where both
permutations are unknown. Set a value q to be determined later. We group k.q distinct
challenges as follows: we put the challenge U j in group G l→t if σU j (l) = t. In fact, a
challenge appears in k groups. These are groups G 1→σUj (1), G 2→σUj (2), . . . , G k→σUj (k).
We obtain k2 groups with approximately q challenges in each. The right hand side
of equation (2) is fixed for all challenges in the same group, since σU (l) = t for all
U ∈ G l→t . Hence the left hand side should be fixed for all challenges in the same group
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as well, since neither al not bn changes. We deploy this property and use the following
algorithm to filter out “bad groups” and recover relations which allow us to forge the
response. Since C1 and C2 are fixed, σC2(i) and σ
−1
C1 (n) are fixed for (i,n) fixed. So,
σC2(i) for i ∈ [1,m] can only map to m distinct positions, therefore l can have only m
possibilities out of k. The same is true for σ−1C1 (n) which can only have m possibilities
for t. Intuitively, what we mean by a “bad group” is a group which whether in the
mapping σ−1C2 (l) maps l out of the corresponding windows of size m or in the mapping
σC1(t) maps t out of the corresponding windows of size m. Term “good groups” is used
to recover σC1 , σC2 . We now define more precisely what we mean by a “bad group” and
how they can be filtered.
Definition 1. We call a group a “bad group” if the exists no pair (i,n) ∈ [1,m]2, such
that σC2(i) = l and σ
−1
C1 (n) = t.
Lemma 3. The group G l→t is bad if for every pair (i,n) ∈ [1,m]2 there exists U ∈ G l→t
such that the equation 2 is not satisfied.
Proof. The equation 2 has to be satisfied for group G l→t only if we guess σC2(i) = l
and σ−1C1 (n) = t correctly. If σC2(i) 6= l or σC1(t) 6= n, then given U ∈ G l→t we have
1
2
probability that the equation 2 would be satisfied even if the group is chosen incorrectly.
Therefore, we drop out a “bad group”G l→t if there exists no pair (i,n)∈ [1,m]2 such that
(i→ l → t → n) for which equation (2) is satisfied for all elements (see Fig 9). Following
this step, we also output a correct mapping (i → l → t → n) where (l,t) ∈ [1,k]2 and
(i,n) ∈ [1,m]2. The probability to accept a given incorrect group is lower than k22q . So,
for k4  2q we keep no incorrect group for sure. That is, we need q ≈ 4log2 k.
Now we have m2 groups left after filtering and at least one mapping (i f → l f → t f →
n f ) for a group G l f→t f . These m2 groups correspond to all groups G li→ei for li ∈
{σC2 [1], . . . ,σC2 [m]} and ei ∈{σ
−1
C1 [1], . . . ,σ
−1
C1 [m]} (see Fig. 8). Since σC1 ,σC2 are fixed,
the correct groups correspond to all mappings between the set of m indices
{σC2 [1], . . . ,σC2 [m]} and the set of m indices {σ
−1
C1 [1], . . . ,σ
−1
C1 [m]}.
Now, we fix l to l f . This way we reduce the number of groups to m. At this stage, we
know the exact mapping is i f → l f . Depending on which group G l f→tg we pick at this
stage (we have a free choice of tg), we have m distinct mappings from bit l f . We pick
one of these groups G l f→tg which maps l f to tg. i.e., the mappings on both ends of Fig.
7 are fixed. Then, we go through all m possibilities for n and check for all U ∈ G l f→tg
whether ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U)[n]⊕ g(U)[tg]⊕X [n]⊕X [i f ] is constant. If yes, we
know that tg maps to n. Using all m groups G l f→·, we can recover permutation σ
−1
C1 on
[1,m]. We can fix t to t f this time and perform the same procedure to recover σC2 .
Now we have all we need to forge a response for a new challenge. Let U ′ be a new
challenge. We forge ARMADILLO1d bit by bit. Let consider bit n of the responce R′. We
have recovered σ−1C1 [1,m] and therefore we know σ
−1
C1 (n) where n ∈ [1,m] i.e., position
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Fig. 7. ARMADILLO1d attack scheme
to which the nth bit of the response R′ is mapped. Now we select l 1 such that U ′ ∈
G l→σ−1C1 (n)
. If we find such l (i.e., we find the corresponding group) then we forge the
n = σC1σU σC2(i)-th bit of the response as follows. Let U ∈ G l→σ−1C1 (n)
be a representative
of such a group. From equation (2) we have
ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U)[n]⊕g(U)[t]⊕X [n]⊕X [i]= (al ⊕bn)
ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U ′)[n]⊕g(U ′)[t]⊕X ′[n]⊕X ′[i] = (al ⊕bn)
and therefore
ARMADILLO1d(C‖U ′)[n] = ARMADILLO1d(C‖U)[n]⊕ (X [i]⊕X ′[i])⊕ (g(U)[t]
⊕g(U ′)[t])⊕ (X [n]⊕X ′[n])
If there is no such l (i.e., we cannot find any corresponding group) we forge the n =
σC1 σU σC2(i)-th bit of response as follows. Compared to the previous case we only drop
(X [i]⊕X ′[i]), since X [i] = X ′[i], since the bit is coming from the secret part.
ARMADILLO1d(C‖U ′)[n] = ARMADILLO1d(C‖U)[n]⊕g(U)[t]⊕g(U ′)[t]
⊕X [n]⊕X ′[n]
The complexity of the forgery attack is O (qk4) with qk challenges, where q ≈ 4log2 k.
1 Notice that this l can be in the “bad groups”. We only use the “good groups” to recover the
secret permutations σC2 and σC1 .
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Fig. 8. ARMADILLO1d group filtering scheme
6.2 Extension with the T4 and T2 Transformations
Let now consider the definition for a general case of a T2 and T4 and T1(C1‖C2‖U) =
(C1‖U‖C2), i.e., we assume that pi keeps a large piece of consecutive bits of U together.
ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U) = T4(P(C1‖U‖C2,T2(C1‖C2‖U)),(C1‖C2‖U))
The same steps as the previous attacks hold in the general case as well. In the case
of T2, since the secret is fixed it can be derived out as a constant in our computations.
So, deploying the same grouping strategy, the attack still works. It is not difficult to see
that the same method also holds even if we have the T4 function.
6.3 Extension to a general pi
Let now consider the definition
ARMADILLO1d(X) = P(Xpi,X)⊕X
for X = (C1‖ . . .‖Ct‖U1‖ . . .‖Ut−1). In the algorithm above, the attacker decomposes the
computation of ARMADILLO1d into several stages. Let suppose wlog that we permute
the bits of secret using permutation pi as follows
(C1‖ . . .‖Ct‖U1‖ . . .‖Ut−1)pi = C1‖U1‖C2‖U2‖ . . .‖Ct−1‖Ut−1‖Ct
I.e. pi mixes C and U bits together, without putting too many consecutive bits of U . We
use t times the forgery algorithm on ARMADILLO1d to recover all mappings σCi .
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1: for all G l→t , where (l,t) ∈ [1,k]2 do
2: ω = 0
3: for all (i,n) ∈ [1,m]2 do
4: err = 0
5: pick an arbitrary U1 ∈ G l→m
6: ν = ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U1)[n]⊕g(U1)[t]⊕X [n]⊕X [i]
7: for all U ∈ G l→m\U1 do
8: if ν 6= ARMADILLO1d(C1‖C2‖U)[n]⊕g(U)[t]⊕X [n]⊕X [i] then
9: ω = ω+1
10: err = 1
11: break
12: end if
13: end for
14: if (err == 0) then
15: output (i → l → t → n).
16: end if
17: end for
18: if (ω == m2) then
19: drop G l→t .
20: end if
21: end for
Fig. 9. group filtering algorithm for ARMADILLO1d.
Let assume that 2|Ui | ≥ kq for every i. If this is not the case we can recover the mapping
σCi−1σUi σCi for all evaluations of Ui in polynomial time. In both cases, we recover each
σCi and σCi+1 recursively. To recover σCi and σCi+1 , we fix Ei+1 = Ui+1‖Ci+2‖ . . .‖Ct by
fixing Ui+1, . . . ,Ut−1, since Ci+2, . . . ,Ct is already fixed. Then, the problem is reduced
to the same situation as the previous attack, where we have a challenge part sandwiched
between two intervals of the secret bits C. Finally, we obtain the mapping σC1 on set
[1,m], σC2 , . . . , σCt−1 on set [1,k] and σ
−1
Ct on set [1,m]. Note that we can recover permu-
tations σC2 , . . . , σCt−1 on set [1,k] by setting challenge bits to different values km times.
All we need is to describe an algorithm to recover all constants P(Ci,0). Then we will
have everything we need to forge the response of ARMADILLO1d to any challenge.
We now describe how to recover P(C1,0). The same method can be used to derive
other P(Ci,0) recursively. The same as before, Let fix all Ui’s except U1. We use Lemma
1. and Lemma 2. and rewrite
ARMADILLO1d(X)⊕X = P(C1‖U1‖E2,X)
= P(E2,P(U1,P(C1,X)))
= P(C1,X)σU1 σE2 ⊕P(U1,0)σE2 ⊕P(E2,0)
= P(C1,0)σU1 σE2 ⊕XσU1σE2 ⊕P(U1,0)σE2 ⊕P(E2,0)
which gives us set of linear equations and we can vary σU1 as necessary to obtain a large
system of equations and solve it.
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Complexity. The general attack may iterate the algorithm in Fig. 9. up to k times. In
some iterations, the requirement 2|Ui |≥ k logk does not need to be satisfied. In such case,
we need to extend the interval Ui by guessing some bits of key. Such technique would
require another k logk steps. Therefore, the complexity is bounded by O(k ·k4q ·k logk).
We specified before that q ≈ 4logk. Hence, the complexity of the offline stage of the
attack is O(k6 log2 k) and the algorithm requires at most k3 log2 k queries.
6.4 Attack Impact on ARMADILLO2
We can see ARMADILLO2 as a successor of ARMADILLO1d with a pre-processing T1
which is more elaborate than a simple transposition. Such preprocessing makes it re-
sistant against our attack. Our attack is based on decomposition according to Lemma 1
and a guess of a constant value of function f (U) from Lemma 2. The pre-processing
phase protects against both the decomposition and the constant value of function f (U).
However, the attack we propose points out possible weaknesses in the design of AR-
MADILLO2.
7 Conclusion
We have shown a devastating key recovery attack against ARMADILLO1 and discussed
a potential implication on ARMADILLO2. Although we did not find an attack on AR-
MADILLO2, we have illustrated that the non-linearity based on data-dependent permu-
tations in both ARMADILLO1 and ARMADILLO2 is not sufficient. The results do not
immediately apply on ARMADILLO2 but they allow for better understanding the design
and they might be used to improve the attack in [1].
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